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A MODEL OF TIME-INCONSISTENT
MISCONDUCT: THE CASE OF LAWYER
MISCONDUCT
Manuel A. Utset*
INTRODUCTION

The recent corporate scandals resulted from systematic violations of
federal securities laws and state corporate law by managers over long
periods of time. This type of systematic managerial misconduct requires
the active participation of lawyers or at least their turning a blind eye to
manager actions that should arouse their suspicion and a desire to
investigate further. Thus, corporate scandals invariably lead scholars and
regulators to question the effectiveness of existing regulations of corporate
lawyers.
What can lead lawyers to either actively assist corporate managers in
systematic fraud and criminal activity, or remain ignorant and passive when
they know or should know to inquire and act? A common lawyermisconduct scenario that is hard to regulate is the following: A lawyer
starts with a set of internalized ethical norms that she applies steadfastly to
her professional (and nonprofessional) decisions and actions; however, little
by little the lawyer begins to override those (prima facie applicable)
principles when acting on her client's or her own behalf, until one day the
lawyer and society find that the lawyer has gone from good to bad, with
relative ease and little warning.
The lawyer caught in this moral disintegration scenario faces a series of
ethical dilemmas: repeated opportunities to trump, or not, her personal
ethical principles for more immediate self-interest concerns.1 The more
insidious contexts involve relatively minor, but repeated, misconduct,
where the divergence from a lawyer's ethical code is relatively small and
not, at least on its face, irreversible. This type of incremental decision
making can cause a lawyer to go from good to bad in slippery-slope
fashion, shifting her moral baseline in incremental steps.
This Article offers a new explanation for lawyer misconduct and moral
disintegration, one based on the "time-inconsistent misconduct" model that
I develop in Part III. The time-inconsistent misconduct model builds on the
* Professor of Law, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law. I would like to thank
Nancy McLaughlin, Daniel Medwed, and Linda Smith for their comments.
1. See infra Part II.B (discussing the moral disintegration problem).
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growing empirical evidence finding that people have time-inconsistent
preferences. 2 Time-inconsistent preferences are a product of the simple
(and to many, intuitive) fact that people value immediate gratification.
From a long-term perspective people want to act relatively patiently in
future periods, but when they are faced with immediate costs they often
choose to procrastinate; they do so even though they know that
procrastination hurts them. When people face the prospect of immediate
rewards, the pull of immediate gratification can lead them to act sooner than
they otherwise want to and to overconsume.
Economists have begun to develop time-inconsistent preferences models
to explain under-saving for retirement, procrastination in enrolling in
retirement accounts, addiction to drugs, deadlines in principal-agent
contexts, and commitment devices used by consumers. 3 My timeinconsistent misconduct model builds upon the general intuitions of these
models, extending them to the decisions of individuals to engage in legal
and ethical misconduct and further developing various general implications.
I will say that a person engages in time-inconsistent misconduct
whenever the person has made a long-term decision to abstain from
misconduct in a particular context (after concluding that engaging in that
misconduct does not make economic sense-i.e., its expected costs exceed
expected rewards)-and later reverses that decision and engages in
misconduct solely due to the pull of immediate gratification. 4
This Article develops three general arguments regarding timeinconsistent misconduct and extends them to explain certain types of lawyer
misconduct. First, people will have incentives to engage in timeinconsistent misconduct that provides them with immediate rewards. This
can lead a lawyer to do such things as repeatedly lie, overbill clients, and
embezzle funds even though the lawyer has a long-term preference to
abstain from such misconduct. I refer to this type of behavior as "nibbling
opportunism." A time-inconsistent person may take too many opportunistic
nibbles, in the same manner that she may overconsume cake, cigarettes, and
money early in life notwithstanding a long-term preference to retire in good
health and with sufficient savings.
Second, a person who has made a long-term decision to take a legally
required action at the required time may nonetheless repeatedly
procrastinate following through due to a desire to avoid the immediate
effort and costs of taking the action. This can lead corporate lawyers to
procrastinate confronting managers, making disclosures to the board of
directors, and withdrawing their previous advice.
2. See Christopher Harris & David Laibson, Hyperbolic Discounting & Consumption,
in 1 Advances in Economics & Econometrics, Theory & Applications: 8th World Congress
258, 258-60 (Mathias Dewatripont et al. eds., 2003) (setting forth various findings and
summarizing literature).
3. See infra Part I.C.
4. In other words, the person has not acquired new information showing that engaging
in misconduct actually has positive expected returns.
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Third, a person who has determined that misconduct has positive
expected returns and made a long-term decision to engage in misconduct
may nonetheless repeatedly procrastinate following through if the
immediate costs of engaging in misconduct are sufficiently high. I refer to
this phenomenon as "time-inconsistent honesty."
At the core of the time-inconsistent misconduct model is a positive claim
that the time-inconsistent preferences of individuals are an important source
of systematic misconduct in a variety of legal contexts. From this follows a
normative claim that it is important for policy-makers to take timeinconsistent misconduct into account, given that (1) such misconduct can
impose large welfare losses on third parties and the time-inconsistent actors,
and (2) the incentives and penalties needed to deter time-consistent and
time-inconsistent individuals differ-to effectively deter the latter, policymakers need to directly target the short-term preferences that motivate time5
inconsistent misconduct.
Part I summarizes the evidence on time-inconsistent preferences and the
general models that have been developed by economists to fit this evidence
into received microeconomics and macroeconomics models. Part II
introduces some of the general obstacles to effectively regulating lawyers
and discusses some of the explanations that have been offered for the moral
disintegration of lawyers.
Part III develops the time-inconsistent
misconduct model. Part IV applies the model to lawyer misconduct and
offers suggestions for various policy changes.
Part V offers some
conclusions.
I. TIME-INCONSISTENT PREFERENCES: PROCRASTINATION AND
OVERCONSUMPTION

A. Inter-temporalDecision Making
I will assume that people choose their actions with the general goal of
maximizing their utility. As a general matter, a person deciding whether or
not to take an action will compare the costs and rewards associated with
that action. 6 Many of the decisions that people make in their everyday

5. I have begun this more general project in a series of recent papers. See Manuel A.
Utset, A Theory of Self-Control Problems and Incomplete Contracting: The Case of

Shareholder Contracts,2003 Utah L. Rev. 1329 [hereinafter Utset, Incomplete Contracting]
(arguing that time-inconsistent preferences are a source of contractual gaps); Manuel A.
Utset, Time-Inconsistent Management & The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 33 Ohio N.U. L. Rev.

(forthcoming 2005) (applying the time-inconsistent misconduct model in the context of
recent corporate scandals and Sarbanes-Oxley Act); Manuel A. Utset, A Model of TimeInconsistent Misconduct (Sept. 5, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
[hereinafter Utset, Time-Inconsistent Misconduct] (developing the time-inconsistent
misconduct model); Manuel A. Utset, Time-Inconsistent Reliance and Contract Law (Apr.
2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (showing that time-inconsistent
preference can lead to under-reliance by contract parties).
6. See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 4 (2003).
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lives-both at home and at work-are inter-temporal in nature. An intertemporal decision is one in which the costs and rewards that flow from the
7
decision are not all incurred or received in the same time period.
1. Long-Term Decisions
Suppose that a person has bought a bottle of wine and is trying to decide
whether to drink the bottle in one year's time or in two years; she knows
that waiting two years will improve the wine's taste and her ultimate
enjoyment. People, however, are impatient: As a general matter, they
prefer to receive rewards earlier in time and defer costs until future
periods. 8 Thus, the person's impatience or time preference will lead her to
discount the added pleasure that she expects to get from drinking the more
mature wine in two years. Assume that the person decides that she prefers
to wait the two years. I will refer to this front part of an inter-temporal
decision as a "long-term decision."
2. Short-Term Decisions
Suppose that a year has elapsed and the person revisits her original
decision. At this point, she must choose between drinking the bottle
immediately and waiting an additional year. The person again compares the
pleasure of drinking a wine that has matured for one year with the
(discounted) pleasure of drinking the more mature wine in year two. A
person will make a "short-term decision" to override her long-term decision
for two types of reasons. First, the person has received new information
that leads her to change her original conclusions regarding the wine.
Second, a person may override her long-term decision if she has become
more impatient during the year that has elapsed. That is, if the person
values immediate gratification and the added utility from drinking the wine
immediately is sufficiently high, she will drink the wine in year one.
3. Time-Consistent Preferences
A person with time-consistent preferences, who has not received new
information, will not override her long-term decision; she will always
follow through as planned. 9 A person is said to have "time-consistent

7. Generally, an inter-temporal decision is one that has deferred consequences,
requiring an actor to account for costs and rewards that are distributed over time. See George
F. Loewenstein & Dralen Prelec, Preferences for Sequences of Outcomes, in Choices,

Values, and Frames 565, 565 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000); George
Loewenstein & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: IntertemporalChoice, 3 J. Econ. Persp. 181,
181 (1989) (defining inter-temporal choices as "decisions in which the timing of costs and
benefits are spread out over time").
8. For a general discussion of time discounting, see Shane Frederick et al., Time
Discounting and Time Preference: A CriticalReview, 40 J. Econ. Literature 351 (2002).

9. See Gary S. Becker, Accounting for Tastes 11 (1996) (noting that time-consistent
preferences require that "the choices an individual would like to make in the future, if he
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preferences" if at the time of making her short-term decision she does not
give extra weight to the prospect of immediate gratification; this means that
her level of impatience (or discounting for time preference) stays constant
over time-i.e., it is the same when she makes a short-term decision as it
was when she made her long-term decision. 10 As a result, her short-term
decision will confirm her original, long-term one. A time-consistent wine
drinker will adhere to her original decision and drink the more mature wine
in year two.
B. Inter-temporalDecision Making: GeneralFramework
More generally, when a person makes a long-term decision about a future
action she will follow three steps. First, she will determine the expected
costs and rewards of taking the action, accounting for various risks and her
time preference.
The person will discount for the risk that future
contingencies will have an impact on the costs and rewards of the action.
She will also discount future costs and rewards to account for her time
preference or impatience, as discussed above. After discounting for risks
and impatience, the person will compare the expected costs of the action
with the expected rewards. If the expected rewards exceed the expected
costs, I will say that the action has "positive expected returns"; if expected
costs exceed expected rewards, the action has "negative expected returns."
Second, a person will make a long-term decision to take actions with
positive expected returns and abstain from those with negative expected
returns. Third, if the person has decided to take an action, she will then
determine when to act. A person will choose to take an action in the period
that will maximize the expected returns from that action.
When the allotted time to act arrives, the person will make a short-term
decision to either follow through as planned, or reverse her long-term
decision. A person will reverse her long-term decision if she has acquired
new information showing that the action is no longer worthwhile-i.e., that
it now has negative expected returns.

knew now what would happen in the interim, are exactly the same as the choices he will
actually make then").
10. See David Laibson, Intertemporal Decision Making, in Encyclopedia of Cognitive
Science
(forthcoming
2005)
(manuscript
at
12),
available
at
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/laibson/papers/ecsmar2.pdf
(noting that the
discount rate, which captures the rate of decline of exponential discount function, is constant
over time). Economists introduce the exponential discount factor, 5 (which is set to less than

one), to capture a decision maker's time preference. The decision maker is assumed to give

full weight to costs and rewards to be incurred in the current period; she also discounts all
future costs and rewards using her exponential discount factor-i.e., her discounting in the
current period, period 1, period 2, and so on would be as follows: 1, 5, 52, 53 ...
In
making tradeoffs between any two adjacent periods, therefore, a person always discounts by

her discount factor 5.
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C. Time-Inconsistent Preferences
A person with time-inconsistent preferences will make long-term
decisions using the three-step decision-making framework set forth in the
previous section. At the time of making her long-term decision, the timeinconsistent person has a long-term preference to act in a time-consistent
manner.
However, unlike her time-consistent counterpart, a timeinconsistent person will sometimes reverse her long-term decisions even
though she has not acquired new information. At the time of making a
short-term decision, a person with time-inconsistent preferences will give
added weight to the prospect of immediate gratification; if that added
weight is sufficiently great, the person will choose to override her long-term
11
decision.
There is a large body of evidence from economics experiments showing
that people value immediate gratification; 12 when they make long-term
decisions, they want to be relatively patient, but become increasingly
impatient the closer they get to receiving a reward or having to incur a cost.
Thus, from a long-term point of view, people tend to have the best
intentions for their future selves: They make plans to start diets, stop
smoking, and finish writing papers. However, when the time to act arrives,
the chocolate cake trumps the diet, Joe Camel prevails, and finishing the
paper gives way to going to the movies.
1. Procrastination
A person with a preference for immediate gratification will give added
weight to a cost that she has to incur immediately. At the time of making a
long-term decision to take an action, a person will discount costs-to
account for risks and her long-term time preference-in the same manner as
a time-consistent person. However, when the allotted time to act arrives, a
time-inconsistent person will give added weight to the immediate costs of
following through, and if the added weight is great enough, she will
procrastinate. 13

11. See Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing ItNow or Later, 89 Am. Econ. Rev.
103, 106 (1999) (noting that when people calculate trade-offs between undertaking onerous
tasks in one of two future periods, they tend to give extra relative weight to the earlier period
as it gets closer in time). This is due to the fact that instead of the constant level of
impatience-i.e., constant discount rates-that motivates time-consistent preferences,
individuals tend to have declining discount rates. See Richard H. Thaler, Some Empirical
Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency, in Quasi Rational Economics 127, 128-30 (1991)
(finding that the implicit discount rate dropped as the length of the delay in receiving the
promised money increased).
12. See George A. Akerlof, Procrastinationand Obedience, 81 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers
& Proc.) 1, 5-8 (1991) (summarizing empirical evidence of procrastination in areas of drug
addiction, savings behavior, and within organizations); Harris & Laibson, supra note 2, at
258.
13. See Akerlof, supra note 12, at 1 (noting that individuals procrastinate "when present
costs are unduly salient in comparison with future costs, leading individuals to postpone
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A person "procrastinates" when she (1) makes a long-term decision to
take an action at a particular time, and (2) makes a short-term decision to
delay for at least one period in order to avoid the added disutility of having
to incur immediate costs. A person with time-consistent preferences would
never procrastinate, since by definition she does not give added weight to
immediate costs.
For example, a person with a long-term preference to enroll in a
retirement account will procrastinate following through if the immediate
cost of enrolling is sufficiently high, compared with the loss that she will
suffer from delaying one period.
2. Overconsumption
A preference for immediate gratification will also lead a person to give
added weight to a reward that she can receive immediately. This can lead a
person to take actions sooner than she had wanted (i.e., to reverse long-term
decisions to be more patient). Over time, repeated reversals of this sort can
lead a person to take more actions of a particular type than she wanted from
a long-term perspective. In short, she may "overconsume" vis-A-vis her
long-term preferences.
A person "overconsumes" when she does as follows: (1) makes a longterm decision to take an action at a particular time; and (2) makes a shortterm decision to act at least one period earlier than she had wanted, due to
the added utility from the immediacy of a reward. 14 This means that a
person also overconsumes when she makes a long-term decision to abstain
from taking an action, but later reverses that decision given the prospect of
an immediate reward. For the same reasons as above, a person with timeconsistent preferences will not engage in overconsumption.
For example, suppose a person, for health reasons, has made a long-term
decision to abstain from eating chocolate cake. The person will reverse that
decision and eat a slice of cake in each period in which the added utility

tasks until tomorrow without foreseeing that when tomorrow comes, the required action will
be delayed yet again").
14. See O'Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 11, at 104 (distinguishing between taking
action when one should wait, given that one receives immediate rewards, but delayed costs,
and procrastination, delaying action one should take, because of immediate costs and
delayed rewards). The following table sets forth the various relative timing for costs and
rewards and their effect on a person's incentive to procrastinate, act too soon, or
overconsume.

Costs
(immediate)
Costs
(delayed)

Rewards

Rewards

(immediate)

(delayed)

Depends on relative costbenefit analysis
Act too soon; overconsume

Procrastinate
Immediate gratification
not an issue
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from immediate gratification is greater than the added incremental future
cost (in reduction of health and medical costs) from eating the slice.
3. Awareness of Propensity to Override Long-Term Decisions
Each time that a person procrastinates or overconsumes she incurs a
(delayed) welfare loss-i.e., a loss that she would have avoided if she had
adhered to her long-term preferences. Commitment devices allow a person
to avoid these welfare losses, but they are costly-they take time and effort
15
to implement and restrict the set of future actions available to a person;
therefore, commitment devices will be adopted only when their benefits
16
exceed the costs.
A "sophisticated" person correctly predicts the full magnitude of her
future temptation to override her long-term decisions and adopts
commitment devices to restrict her ability to do so. A naive person is
completely unaware of her time-inconsistent preferences and never incurs
the costs of adopting commitment devices; therefore, over time, she can
suffer large aggregate welfare losses. Real people actually tend to be
overoptimistic about their future ability to withstand the pull of immediate
gratification-i.e., they are neither fully naive nor fully sophisticated, but
are "partially naive." 17 Therefore, they may not adopt fully effective
18
commitment devices.
4. Commitment Devices as Evidence of Time Inconsistency
A time-consistent person, by definition, knows that she will never reverse
her long-term decisions and will never incur the costs of commitment.
Therefore, evidence that people adopt commitment devices provides
positive confirmation of time-inconsistent preferences and of people's
awareness of their time inconsistency. 19
For, example, people with long-term preferences to eat healthily,
exercise, and lose weight, but who repeatedly yield to immediate
gratification, join health clubs and go to special weight-loss spas, both of

15. A "commitment device" is any mechanism adopted by a person to restrict her ability
to yield to self-control problems in future periods-i.e., to restrict the set of actions available
to her future, less patient self.
16. I will assume throughout this Article that the benefits of commitment devices exceed

the costs.
17. See

Dan

Ariely

&

Klaus

Wertenbroch,

Procrastination, Deadlines, and

Performance: Self-Control by Precommitment, 13 Psychol. Sci. 219, 220-22 (2002)
(presenting a study finding that a group of students with external deadlines performed better
than a second group who underappreciated the full extent of their propensity to procrastinate,
and adopted suboptimal deadlines).
18. See Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Choice and Procrastination, 116 Q.J.

Econ. 121, 127 (2001) (asserting that even small amounts of overoptimism can lead a
partially naive person to act in same manner as a naive person).
19. See O'Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 11, at 105 (stating that economists use
commitment devices as evidence-"smoking guns"-of time-inconsistent preferences).
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which require costly up-front commitments; students and professors use
deadlines (preferably externally imposed) 20 to combat their temptation to
procrastinate completing papers. Some economists have argued that people
with long-term preferences to set enough money aside for retirement make
highly illiquid investments in their youth-e.g., purchasing homes-to
retirement accounts
prevent themselves from overconsuming early in life;
21
with penalties for withdrawals serve similar purposes.
II. LAWYER MISCONDUCT: THE PROBLEM

A. Some Difficulties in Regulating Lawyers
The regulation of lawyers is made difficult by a number of well-known
obstacles. 22 A lawyer generally serves more than one master-i.e., the
client, society, and herself. Lawyers perform various tasks on behalf of
their clients: For example, they act as advocates, provide legal advice,
structure transactions, and help meet regulatory requirements. 23 As a
general matter, a lawyer's highest duty is to her client. However, lawyers
also owe a duty to society, given that they are granted a legal monopoly that
provides them with great power, prestige, and financial rewards. Finally,
lawyers are motivated, at least in part, by their own self-interest, something
that no amount of regulation can extinguish, or would want to. (After all,
regulations work because lawyers react to rewards and penalties in a selfinterested manner.)
One can divide the potential conflicts arising from the three-way nature
of this relationship into three categories: client and lawyer vs. society;
lawyer and society vs. client; and client and society vs. lawyer. An

20. See, e.g., Ariely & Wertenbroch, supra note 17, at 220-24 (offering the example of
deadlines as commitment devices); T.C. Schelling, Egonomics, or the Art of SelfManagement, 68 Am. Econ. Rev. 290, 290 (1978) (discussing various commitment devices);
Klaus Wertenbroch, Consumption Self-Control by Rationing Purchase Quantities of Virtue
and Vice, 17 Marketing Sci. 317, 317 (1998) (noting that paying a premium to acquire
cigarettes can be a commitment device). Drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs require
minimum stays and full payment (up front) for the required treatment period, a part of which
is kept if the patient checks out early. For example the Cirque Lodge, a well-known facility
of this type, has a thirty-day minimum stay and requires patients to pay for that thirty-day
period at the time that they check in. See Cirque Lodge-Admission Criteria and Costs,
http://www.cirquelodge.com/admission.php (last visited Oct. 21, 2005) (stating that patients
are required to make a deposit of $34,800 to stay at the Lodge and $24,750 for the studio at
time of check-in).
21. See David Laibson, Life-Cycle Consumption and Hyperbolic Discount Functions,42
Eur. Econ. Rev. 861, 868 (1998) (discussing commitment devices to deal with
procrastination in saving for retirement, including holding illiquid assets, such as those via
defined benefit pensions, 401(k)s, social security contributions, and home equity).
22. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 Stan. L.
Rev. 589 (1985).
23. See Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers and
Their Clients, 67 S. Cal L. Rev. 507, 518-53 (1994) (discussing various roles played by
corporate lawyers).
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important difficulty in crafting ethics rules is that of providing lawyers with
the right incentives to act on behalf of client, society, and self in a manner
that will meet more general, substantive social goals.
The dynamic nature of the client-lawyer-society relationships,
informational problems, and the incomplete nature of the contracts and
professional and legal rules that bind the parties, all contribute to the
regulatory difficulty. For example, a requirement to keep a client's
confidence protects the client against inappropriate collusion between a
lawyer and regulators or third parties against a client, and encourages
clients to be forthcoming with information needed by lawyers to properly
represent them; 24 at the same time, it allows a client and lawyer to collude
Informational
"inappropriately" (however defined) against others.
problems and incomplete rules make it difficult, although not impossible, to
resolve these problems in a satisfactory manner.
Lawyers not only have to balance their own interests with those of
society, but in doing so they have to balance at least two different,
sometimes conflicting sets of ethical rules: the code of professional ethics
and the lawyer's own set of personal moral rules. This is no easy task. One
problem is that moral rules are by nature defeasible, a task made easier if
one can resort to another set of ethical norms for support. The lawyer can
use duty to defeat truth, fidelity to defeat candor, and so on. Additionally,
the lawyer can deploy nonethical reasons to defeat ethical rules.
There is an additional obstacle to regulating corporate lawyers.
Managers, accountants, board members, and lawyers work together to
create disclosure documents, structure transactions, and undertake a variety
25
of other tasks that can later be challenged by shareholders and regulators.
Cooperation by team members has economic value; however, it also makes
it difficult, when a claim of misconduct is raised to determine the
complicity and responsibility of each party. 26 A coarse rule for punishing
misconduct-one that fails to distinguish sufficiently between the various

24. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2003) (stating that the
confidentiality requirement promotes trust between lawyer and client and encourages
communication).
25. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Sharing Accounting's Burden: Business
Lawyers in Enron's Dark Shadows, 57 Bus. Law. 1421, 1454-56 (2002) (discussing the

intersection between legal and accounting issues and the need for accounting knowledge by
lawyers); Manuel A. Utset, Producing Information: Initial Public Offerings, Production

Costs, and the Producing Lawyer, 74 Or. L. Rev. 275 (1995) (arguing that lawyers act as a
form of "translator" between the different group members involved in drafting securities
prospectuses).
26. See Roger C. Crampton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and

Ethical Issues, 58 Bus. Law. 143, 174 (2002) (arguing that lawyers, managers, accountants,
and other group members rationalize their behavior by blaming misconduct on others);
Cunningham, supra note 25, at 1454-55 (discussing the "pass-the-buck" problem between
the lawyers and accountants and the diffusion of responsibility due to artificial boundaries
between two professions). For a discussion of the general difficulties of providing incentives
to team members, see Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs,
and Economic Organization,62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777 (1972).
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parties-can create a number of misincentives, such as undermining
to share information
cooperation and trust between parties, and a reluctance
27
or rely on the information provided by others.
B. Moral Disintegration
What can lead otherwise good lawyers to go so bad? A lawyer goes bad
when misconduct becomes systematic, when she repeatedly overrides her
personal moral code and engages in misconduct that violates the law or the
rules of professional responsibility. An otherwise good, ethical lawyer is
unlikely to go from good to bad if she engages in misconduct just once.
However, when a lawyer has repeated opportunities to engage in minor
misconduct that provides her with relatively small incremental gains and
losses, misconduct becomes more tempting, and easier to justify ex ante and
ex post. These types of contexts are particularly prone to what can be
referred to as the "just-this-one-last-time" syndrome.
A number of explanations have been offered for the good lawyer's
traversal to the bad side; these include greed, 2 8 the existence of institutional
constraints and reward structures that make it difficult for well-intentioned
lawyers to keep to their "better" principles, pressure to conform, habit and
acculturation, 29 and unconscious rationalizations due to cognitive
dissonance. 30 While I am sympathetic to the role of habit, acculturation,
and cognitive dissonance in moving lawyers along the path toward moral
disintegration, such explanations rely to a large extent on forces mostly
beyond the lawyer's control. Cognitive dissonance does most of its work
below the deliberative radar-i.e., subconsciously. Additionally, once a
lawyer's dissonance process gets started (even by the smallest ethical
misstep), it feeds back upon itself in a mutually recursive, slippery-slope
fashion, making positive confirmation difficult.3 1 Habit and acculturation

27. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundationsof Corporate Law, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1735 (2001) (discussing the role of trust
and cooperation in the corporate context); Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal Fairness,Strategic
Behavior & Venture Survival: A Theory of Venture Capital-FinancedFirms, 2002 Wis. L.

Rev. 45, 132-38 (setting forth an analogous informational hold-up problem in the venture
capital context).
28. See Lisa G. Lerman, The Slippery Slope from Ambition to Greed to Dishonesty:

Lawyers, Money, and ProfessionalIntegrity, 30 Hofstra L. Rev. 879, 888-90 (2002) (citing
lawyer greed as the principal catalyst for the slippery-slope slide to misconduct).
29. Rhode, supra note 22, at 633-38; Deborah L. Rhode, If Integrity Is the Answer, What
Is the Question?, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 333, 335-36 (2003).
30. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Epistemology of Corporate-SecuritiesLawyering:

Beliefs, Biases and Organizational Behavior, 63 Brook. L. Rev. 629, 647-48 (1997)
(explaining cognitive dissonance); David Luban, Integrity: Its Causes and Cures, 72
Fordham L. Rev. 279 (2003) (discussing role of deception and cognitive dissonance).
31. Luban acknowledges that the cognitive dissonance resort to unconscious reasoning
can raise questions regarding free will and moral responsibility. See David J. Luban, The
Ethics of Wrongful Obedience, in Ethics in Practice 94, 112-13 (Deborah L. Rhode ed.,
2000). Although Luban suggests a number of ways out of the determinism dilemma, the
prominence of the unconscious in dissonance explanations creates a series of other problems,
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explanations leave greater room for the exercise of free will, but still have a
semiautomatic feel to them. In Part IV, I offer a simpler and, I believe,
more intuitive explanation for what motivates lawyers to repeatedly
override their moral principles. The explanation is based on the concept of
time-inconsistent misconduct. However, I first need to develop the timeinconsistent misconduct model.
III. A MODEL OF TIME-INCONSISTENT MISCONDUCT

In this part, I summarize the applicable parts of a model of timeinconsistent misconduct that I develop in greater detail elsewhere. 32 The
principal goal of the current Article is to extend the time-inconsistent
misconduct model to explain the observed misconduct of lawyers.
A. Defining Misconduct
I start with the premise that certain types of misconduct have already
been identified by society, parties to a transaction, or a person
contemplating engaging in misconduct-i.e., a person may decide that she
will act in accordance with certain moral strictures and will label as
misconduct any action that deviates from her moral code.
1. Two Types of Misconduct
For our purposes, a person engages in misconduct when she fails to
follow the dictates of a rule defining misconduct that is applicable to her. A
person can engage in misconduct in two ways: (1) taking an action that,
under a rule, she was under a duty not to take; or (2) failing to take an
action that she was under a duty to take.
For example, criminal law and tort law require that people take some
actions and abstain from taking others to avoid liability. Under agency law,
a fiduciary owes a duty of loyalty and cannot take certain affirmative
actions that hurt the principal: A manager cannot take a corporate
opportunity; a lawyer cannot embezzle her client's funds. A fiduciary's
duty of loyalty and duty of care also requires her to take certain affirmative
actions on behalf of the principal. Additionally, a person may decide that
her own moral code requires certain actions and prohibits others. A lawyer
may determine that she has a moral obligation to disclose information about
her client's illegal activities, notwithstanding professional ethics rules that

not the least of which is how one can measure the extent of the problems and viability of
proposed solutions. These problems by themselves do not make the dissonance theory
unhelpful or unworkable, but do increase the importance of trying to find alternative
explanations to the slippery slope that Luban describes. This Article proposes one such
alternative explanation, not meant to disprove the cognitive dissonance arguments, but as an
alternative.
32. See Utset, Time-InconsistentMisconduct, supra note 5.
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prohibit her doing so, or a moral obligation to abstain from engaging in
33
opportunistic behavior that is legal but would hurt others.
2. Incremental Misconduct
Misconduct generally has a history-it involves a series of decisions and
actions over time that culminates in one or more acts of misconduct. In this
Article, I am concerned with two types of incremental behavior. First, a
person may engage in repeated misconduct over time-e.g., a lawyer may
repeatedly embezzle money from her clients, assist them in illegal actions,
or fail to make required disclosures. Second, a person engaged in
misconduct will, over time, take a series of actions in furtherance of that
misconduct; these actions may or may not constitute misconduct and
include actions to plan, coordinate, or hide misconduct and a person's
decision not to disclose her own or a coconspirator's past or current
misconduct.
A person will (at least in theory) choose each action taking into account
how it fits within her past history of misconduct and the actions that she
may take in the future. When a person is accused of having engaged in
misconduct, this history will be reconstructed and deployed to prove a
number of things, including that the person knew or should have known that
her actions involved misconduct; the misconduct was intended, or done
with malice; or the person was justified or excused in her actions. 34 When
passing judgment on misconduct, a number of questions may be raised

33. In the words of Oliver Williamson, "opportunism" means not mere self-interested
behavior, but
self-interest seeking with guile. This includes but is scarcely limited to more
blatant forms, such as lying, stealing, and cheating. Opportunism more often
involves subtle forms of deceit. Both active and passive forms and both ex ante
and ex post types are included ....
More generally, opportunism refers to the incomplete or distorted disclosure of
information, especially to calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate,
or otherwise confuse.
Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 47 (1985); see also Oliver E.
Williamson, Opportunistic Behaviour in Contracts, in 2 The New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics & the Law 703, 703-10 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (stating that "[o]pportunism is
a type of self-interest seeking and may be contrasted both with stewardship (unself-interest
seeking) and with simple self-interest seeking (look to your interests but keep all of your
promises)").
34. The ex post reconstruction of a history of alleged misconduct is subject to a
hindsight bias that can distort the manner in which that history is constructed, the relative
importance given to actions and inactions, and the conclusion drawn in passing judgment.
For a discussion of the hindsight bias in making judgments of this sort, see Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight,65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 571
(1998). This hindsight bias in the reconstruction of past events can affect not only the actors
who are directly engaged in misconduct but lawyers and other professionals who advised
them during the course of the alleged misconduct. See Crampton, supra note 26, at 147
(arguing that lawyers should anticipate hindsight bias when advising clients acting at the
margin of legality).
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regarding the incremental nature of that misconduct. Why did the person
not stop her misconduct sooner? What moral and legal judgment should
follow from the repeated nature of her misconduct? What does the repeated
nature of the misconduct tell us about the person's knowledge, intent, or
disregard for the law?
B. Choosing Misconduct to Maximize Utility
The standard law and economics model of misconduct and the timeinconsistent misconduct model start with the assumption that a person will
engage in misconduct only if the expected rewards exceed expected costs
(taking into account the probability of being caught and penalized, and the
magnitude of the penalties). 35 If misconduct has positive expected returns,
a person will determine the optimal period to act-i.e., the period that
maximizes returns-and make a long-term decision to engage in
misconduct in that period.
Moreover, a person will reverse a long-term decision to engage in
misconduct if she has acquired new information indicating that the planned
misconduct is no longer economically worthwhile--e.g., new information
regarding the penalties imposed in recent cases.
C. Definitions and Assumptions
In what follows, I will routinely compare "time-consistent" and "timeinconsistent" individuals. I do so to contrast the conclusions of my model
with those of the standard model. It is not meant to imply that real people
are either completely time-consistent or time-inconsistent. In the real
world, individuals will have time-inconsistent preferences, but will exhibit
different levels of time-inconsistency depending on how much weight they
give to immediate gratification and their awareness of the problem.
Importantly, however, even a very small preference for immediate
gratification can lead to the sort of systematic misconduct predicted by the
model.
1. Time-Inconsistent Misconduct
Recall that a person engages in "time-inconsistent misconduct" when she
(1) has determined that a particular type of misconduct has negative
expected returns and thus made a long-term decision to abstain from
35. This follows from the general premise that individuals choose their actions to
maximize their utility. See Posner, supra note 6, at 219 (concluding that a rational criminal
will commit a crime if the expected rewards exceed expected costs); Steven Shavell,
Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 479-80 (2004). The person will also discount
exponentially to account for her long-term time preference, in the manner set forth in Part I.
See supra Part I.A.3. I will assume throughout that decision makers are risk neutral,
something that does not affect the general conclusions, given, in part, that my principal focus
is on time preference and will in most instances assume that decision makers have complete
information about future contingencies.
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misconduct in one or more future periods, and (2) overrides that long-term
decision and engages in misconduct solely due to her preference for
immediate gratification.
2. Assumptions
In order to isolate the time-inconsistent sources of misconduct, I will
adopt the following three assumptions throughout the rest of the Article.
a. The No New Information Assumption
I will assume that once a person has made a long-term decision to engage
in misconduct, she does not receive new information that would cause her
to reverse that decision. This means that the only thing that can lead a
person to reverse her long-term decision is her short-term impatience.
b. Negative Expected Returns Assumptions
I also assume that in all instances in which a person makes a long-term
decision regarding future misconduct, the misconduct in question has
negative expected returns-i.e., the expected costs of misconduct always
A caveat-this assumption and the
exceed the expected rewards.
conclusions that will follow from it do not affect conclusions regarding the
more familiar misconduct scenario in which misconduct has positive
expected returns: In that case the person will make a long-term decision to
engage in misconduct.
c. No Long-Term DiscountingAssumption
Recall that when a person makes a long-term decision, she discounts all
future costs and rewards to account for her general level of impatience or
time preference. I will assume throughout that people have no long-term
This
impatience and thus do not engage in long-term discounting.
36
assumption does not affect any of the conclusions below.
D. A Time-ConsistentPerson
Since by assumption misconduct always has negative expected returns, a
time-consistent person will always make the same long-term decision: to
abstain from misconduct in all periods in which she has the opportunity to
36. This follows from the fact that the only difference between a time-consistent and
time-inconsistent person is that the time-inconsistent person gives added weight to
immediate costs and rewards, and from a long-term perspective all of the costs and rewards
associated from misconduct are delayed. Therefore, when a person with time-inconsistent
preferences makes a long-term decision she will engage in the same long-term discounting
as her time-consistent counterpart and will always make the same decision. This means that
setting the exponential discount factor, 6, to 1 will not affect the outcome. See supra note 10
and accompanying text.
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engage in misconduct. Given the no new information assumption, the timeconsistent person will always follow through as planned and abstain from
misconduct.
Therefore, the standard model of misconduct predicts that a person will
never engage in time-inconsistent misconduct, or if one allows for the
occasional mistake, that a person's time-consistent preferences will prevent
her from engaging in systematic time-inconsistent misconduct. As a result,
a time-consistent person will not incur welfare losses from misconduct
(except for any produced by the occasional, nonsystematic mistake).
E. The Time-Inconsistent Misconduct Model
In this section I develop four conclusions of the time-inconsistent
misconduct model. First, unlike her time-consistent counterpart, a person
with time-inconsistent preferences may engage in time-inconsistent
misconduct in one or more periods. Second, she does so even though she
knows that the actual costs of misconduct are greater than the rewards.
Third, a person may repeatedly engage in time-inconsistent misconduct
notwithstanding the fact that over time her behavior will produce large
welfare losses for her and third parties affected by her misconduct. Fourth,
on average a person with time-inconsistent preferences will engage in more
misconduct than a time-consistent person.
1. Nibbling Opportunism: Overconsuming Misconduct
In this section, the misconduct in question-nibbling opportunism-has
the following four characteristics. First, a person is under a duty to abstain
from taking an action (the "prohibited action"). Second, if the person takes
a prohibited action she triggers a penalty (the only cost of misconduct) that
is delayed for at least one period. Third, when a person takes a prohibited
action she receives an immediate reward. 37 Fourth, the actual face value of
this reward (i.e., the way that the person perceives it from a long-term
perspective) is always less than the penalty and remains the same in all
periods in which the person can engage in misconduct.
a. Incremental Gains and Lossesfrom ProhibitedAction
For each period in which a person can take a prohibited action she will
give added weight to the immediate rewards from that action; the
magnitude of this added weight depends on that person's level of preference
for immediate gratification. Therefore, each time that a person engages in
misconduct the incremental "gain from the prohibited action" is the
37. Given the no long-term discounting assumption, delayed rewards and costs will not
be discounted to account for a person's long-term impatience. Additionally, since my goal
here is to distinguish between the effects of immediate rewards and immediate costs, I will
assume that if misconduct has immediate rewards, all those rewards are immediate and all
costs delayed; if it has immediate costs, all costs are immediate and all rewards delayed.
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of the reward) that the person gets
additional utility (over the actual value
38
due to the immediacy of the reward.
Since, by assumption, the penalty for misconduct is delayed, the person
will see that penalty at its face value-i.e., she will not give it the added
weight that she would if she had to incur that penalty immediately. This
means that each time that a person engages in misconduct the incremental
"loss from the prohibited action" is equivalent to the difference between the
actual reward (i.e., without the added weight) and the penalty for taking the
prohibited action in that period.
b. Long-Term and Short-Term Decisions
The person will make a long-term decision to abstain from taking the
prohibited action in all future periods. As with the time-consistent person,
this is due to the assumption that engaging in misconduct always has
negative expected returns.
My first proposition is the following: A person will make a short-term
decision to take a prohibited action in each period in which the incremental
gain from the prohibited action exceeds the incremental loss. A person will
do so even though she knows that the penalty that she incurs exceeds the
actual reward from taking the prohibited action. As long as the added
utility from grabbing the immediate reward is sufficiently high, the person
will willingly incur that penalty.
However, since a person has a long-term preference to act in a timeconsistent manner-i.e., not to yield to the pull of immediate gratificationeach time that she takes a prohibited action, she incurs a welfare loss
equivalent to the difference between the actual reward that she received and
the penalty that was imposed.
c. Awareness of Propensity to Engage in Nibbling Opportunism
A person's awareness of her time-inconsistency will affect how many
opportunistic nibbles she actually takes. A naive person will take a
prohibited action in each and every period in which the incremental gain
exceeds the incremental loss. Recall that at the time of making a long-term
decision, a naive person incorrectly believes that she will act in a timeconsistent manner in all future periods and never engage in timeinconsistent misconduct. As a result, a naive person will never see the need

38. Since, by assumption, the rewards from misconduct are constant over time, this
incremental gain will solely depend on the added weight placed on the immediate reward. If
the rewards varied over time, the person would give extra weight to the immediate reward
and compare it with the reward that she would receive in any other future period in which
she would want to take the prohibited action. Since these other rewards are delayed (and I
am assuming that there is no long-term discounting), the person will perceive them at their
face value.
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to adopt commitment devices, and can incur large aggregate welfare losses
from repeated nibbling opportunism.
On the other hand, a sophisticated person correctly predicts that she will
want to take prohibited actions in future periods. She will therefore adopt a
commitment device to (1) reduce the incremental gain from the prohibited
action, or (2) increase the incremental loss by an amount that is sufficient to
deter future misconduct. For example, the sophisticated person can take
actions to prevent access to the immediate rewards from misconduct, or can
contract with a third party who would provide a sufficiently high additional
penalty each time that she takes prohibited actions. I would argue that a
number of standard contract provisions in financial and construction
contracts can be read as commitment devices-i.e., a person would agree to
those contract provisions even though they provided no other value. A
partially naive person will be overoptimistic about her future ability to
forego opportunistic nibbles and will adopt commitment devices that are
not sufficiently high-powered to deter all future misconduct.
2. Procrastination in Taking Required Actions
The time-inconsistent misconduct in this section has the following four
characteristics. First, a person has a duty to take an action by a required
time period. Second, failing to act by that period constitutes an act of
misconduct and will trigger a penalty that will be imposed in the following
period or in some later period. Moreover, each subsequent delay in taking
the required action will also trigger a penalty to account for that delay.
Third, the person will incur an immediate cost at the time of taking the
required action. Fourth, the actual face value of this cost (i.e., as perceived
from a long-term perspective) remains the same in every period.
a. The Incremental Gain and Loss from Procrastination
A person with a preference for immediate gratification will have a shortterm preference to avoid immediate costs, if possible-i.e., if they can be
delayed until some future period. In other words, at the time of acting, the
immediacy of the cost produces an "added disutility" (over the actual cost
of acting). Each time that a person delays taking a required action, she
avoids this added disutility-this is her "incremental gain from
procrastination." Each time that the person delays taking the required
action, the person incurs a (delayed) penalty-her "incremental loss from
procrastination."
b. Long-Term and Short-Term Decisions
Since misconduct always has negative expected returns, the person
makes a long-term decision to take the required action in the required
period. My second proposition is the following: A person will make a
short-term decision to delay taking the required action in each period in
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which the incremental gain from procrastination exceeds the incremental
loss from procrastination. A naive person will procrastinate in each such
period and may never take the required action. In other words, she may
procrastinate for one period too many-until her time-inconsistent
misconduct is discovered and legal (or other disciplinary) action is brought.
A sophisticated person, foreseeing this possibility, will adopt commitment
devices. For example, she may set a deadline enforced by a third party who
would provide an additional penalty that is sufficiently high to remove her
incentive to procrastinate.
F. Positive and Normative Implications
In this section, I briefly set forth some of the positive and normative
implications of the time-inconsistent misconduct model. In Part IV, I
discuss some further implications in the context of lawyer misconduct.
1. Revealed Preferences and Time-Inconsistent Misconduct
a. StandardMotivationfor Misconduct
The standard time-consistent model predicts that a person will never
engage in systematic time-inconsistent misconduct. Under the model a
person will abstain from misconduct whenever expected costs exceed
expected rewards. Economists often infer the preferences of actors by
observing their behavior-an actor's actions will generally reveal her
preference for taking that action. Therefore, under the standard model, if a
person is observed repeatedly engaging in misconduct, the default
conclusion is that the person is acting under a belief that the misconduct has
positive expected returns.
Even models of misconduct that are not influenced by economics adopt
the general cost-benefit framework when describing observed misconduct.
In other words, not all models accept the premise that people always engage
in misconduct whenever that misconduct has positive expected returns.
However, when actual misconduct is observed, the default explanation
(which can always be rebutted, of course) is that the person must have had a
belief that the misconduct had positive expected returns. 39

39. This belief, of course may be mistaken. Most theories allow for the possibility that
individuals may occasionally engage in misconduct with negative expected returns, due to
some type of mistake-e.g., the decision maker may not have had sufficient information, or
was coerced into taking the action. However, these mistakes are not systematic in nature;
people with long-term preferences to abstain from misconduct will not repeatedly reverse
those long-term preferences due to the same mistake. Sometimes a person may mistakenly
engage in misconduct with negative expected returns, but other times she may abstain from
misconduct that has positive expected returns. As a result, over time these mistakes will
tend to cancel out (i.e., will appear more random in nature). Moreover, even theories based
on a person's overoptimistic assessments or other cognitive biases-which may lead a
person to repeatedly make long-term decisions to engage in misconduct with negative
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b. Ambiguous Motivations and Revealed Preferences
The time-inconsistent misconduct model, on the other hand, predicts that
people may engage in repeated time-inconsistent misconduct,
notwithstanding (1) a long-term preference to always abstain from such
misconduct, and (2) the fact that each time that the person engages in
misconduct she knowingly incurs an incremental welfare loss. Therefore,
under the model, if a person is observed engaging in repeated misconduct, it
is not possible without more evidence to infer that the person is acting
under a belief that misconduct has positive expected returns; she may
instead be engaged in time-inconsistent misconduct.
2. Policy Implications: Inefficient Deterrence
a. StandardSolution: ChangingLong-Term Preferences
Suppose that a policy maker, who adopts the standard time-consistency
assumption, observes a person engaged in repeated misconduct. She will
conclude that to affect deterrence, she will have to change that person's
long-term preferences by an amount that would make misconduct no longer
economically worthwhile. The policy maker may raise expected costs by
increasing the penalties for misconduct or the probability of discovering
ongoing misconduct; alternatively, she may adopt policies to reduce the
expected (gross) rewards from misconduct.
b. The Need to Target Short-Term Preferences
However, a person who engages in time-inconsistent misconduct is
already acting under a belief that expected costs exceed expected rewards.
As a result, the above policy changes will not be effective to deter timeinconsistent misconduct unless they impact the immediate rewards and
immediate costs that motivate such misconduct. My third proposition is the
following: In order to deter time-inconsistent misconduct, a policy maker
will need to reduce the incremental gain or increase the incremental loss
from misconduct by a sufficient amount. In other words, a policy maker
has to adopt the same strategy used by sophisticated individuals when they
adopt commitment devices to deter their "future selves" from engaging in
misconduct.
i. Taking Prohibited Actions
Suppose that a person who has a long-term preference to abstain from
misconduct is observed engaging in repeated nibbling opportunism. A
policy maker can either reduce the immediate rewards or increase the

expected returns-share the general pattern of time-consistent models: short-term decisions
ratify those long-term decisions.
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incremental loss that the person incurs each time that she takes an
opportunistic nibble. For example, when prosecutors bring multi-count
indictments, they are sometimes accused, no doubt to an extent correctly, of
trying to create bargaining leverage to force a plea or to induce a defendant
to testify against a codefendant. However, the prospect of a multi-count
indictment can act as a commitment device since it also has the effect of
increasing the incremental loss to a person for each individual act of timeinconsistent misconduct.
ii. Procrastination in Taking Required Actions
Suppose that a person repeatedly procrastinates taking an action that she
is under a duty to take. In order to deter this type of time-inconsistent
misconduct, a policy maker can either decrease the immediate costs of
taking the required action or increase the incremental loss that the person
incurs each time that she procrastinates. A number of provisions in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act have the effect of reducing the immediate costs of
confronting and disciplining managers by board members, auditors, and
lawyers. 40 Therefore, these provisions not only deter time-consistent
misconduct but they also act as commitment devices to reduce timeinconsistent procrastination by gatekeepers.
To a large extent, these provisions are a more direct and efficient way of
deterring time-inconsistent misconduct than the increased penalties of
Sarbanes-Oxley. This is because very high-powered penalty schemes, such
as those in Sarbanes-Oxley, impose significant costs on society, including
administrative and error costs (for example, the penalizing of individuals
who did not engage in misconduct). They also create a series of wellknown misincentives: For example, they can lead to wasteful avoidance of
valuable but risky transactions and excessive, overly formalistic record
keeping, and may cause agents to focus on tasks that are less likely to
41
trigger penalties at the expense of other more valuable tasks.
3. A Time-Inconsistent Person's Welfare Losses: Policy Implications
Society has an interest in deterring time-inconsistent misconduct that
hurts third parties; however, I argue that even when third parties are not
hurt, policy makers can create value by effectively deterring time40. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2000 & Supp. II
2002) (requiring a wholly independent audit committee, thereby reducing the ability of
managers to increase immediate costs to the board of directors of challenging financial
statements prepared by managers); id. § 303, 15 U.S.C. § 7242 (making it illegal for
managers to increase the immediate costs to auditors of refusing to go along with fraudulent
financial statements); id. § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (reducing the immediate costs to lawyers
of confronting managers who are acting illegally; increasing the costs to lawyers of delaying
taking "up the ladder" problems not properly addressed; and reducing the immediate costs of
withdrawing representation of a corporate client).
41. See Utset, supra note 27, at 128-42 (arguing that analogous misincentives are
produced by high-powered incentive schemes in venture capital contracts).
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inconsistent misconduct. Each time that a person engages in timeinconsistent misconduct, she incurs a welfare loss equivalent to the
incremental loss from misconduct, which depending on a person's level of
awareness and the availability of commitment devices can add up to large
aggregate welfare losses.
Policy makers can provide commitment devices to help deter this
misconduct. They can provide sophisticated individuals with what I refer to
as "off-the-rack" commitment devices-i.e., government can supply the
rope, the mast, and information about the Sirens, but it does not
(necessarily) have to tie Ulysses to the mast. These commitment devices
can either be default rules or require that a person opts in. In some
instances, policy makers will have to provide mandatory devices-i.e., to
deter misconduct by naive (and sufficiently partially naive) individuals who
are overoptimistic about their own abilities 42to abstain from misconduct and
will opt out of default commitment devices.
Opt-in devices would provide standard-form solutions to typical timeinconsistent misconduct scenarios and thus reduce the cost of commitment.
A sophisticated person will opt out of default commitment devices when
she has available less costly forms of commitment. As with default rules
generally, off-the-rack commitment devices can provide value where a large
number of individuals routinely face the same misconduct scenario and
adopt their own devices.
G. Time-Inconsistent Honesty
So far I have assumed that misconduct always has negative expected
returns. I will now make the opposite assumption-that misconduct has
positive expected returns. Given this assumption, it follows that timeconsistent and time-inconsistent individuals will always have long-term
preferences to engage in misconduct. For the same reasons as before, the
time-consistent person will always follow through with her planned
misconduct.
1. Delayed Misconduct
Suppose that misconduct requires a person to incur immediate costs at
the time of following through-e.g., in time and effort, added anxiety, and

42. Tax withholding is one such device, most colorfully summarized by E.B. White. In
complaining about its advent, he claims that the rule betrays a government with little
confidence in the citizenry: "[Ijf left to your own devices, you will fritter away your worldly
goods and tax day will catch you without cash." E.B. White, The Second Tree from the
Corner 123 (1954). Default commitment devices do not have to be mandatory to the extent
that the immediate costs of opting out are sufficiently high to lead a naive or partially naive
person to repeatedly procrastinate opting out. The same argument generalizes to mandatory
and default rules in other contexts. See Utset, Incomplete Contracting,supra note 5, at 1384
(arguing that a person may repeatedly procrastinate opting out of default rules).
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so on. 43 My fourth proposition is the following: A person with a long-term
preference to engage in value-maximizing misconduct will procrastinate
following through with the planned misconduct in each period in which the
incremental gain from procrastination (in the form of delaying the
immediate costs) exceeds the incremental loss from procrastination (in the
form of the forgone misconduct rewards due to having procrastinated that
period).
Moreover, a person may repeatedly procrastinate and never follow
through with misconduct that would have yielded her positive expected
returns. While this person behaves properly, she does so for the wrong
reasons (because of her self-control problems). I therefore refer to this type
of behavior as "time-inconsistent honesty."
2. Normative Implications
This puzzling result is more than a mere curiosity, since it has a number
of important normative implications.
a. Misguided Deregulation
Suppose that a policy maker who adheres to the time-consistency
assumption is reevaluating an existing regulatory regime. She has gathered
evidence that over a period of time the regulated actors have abstained from
systematic misconduct. Assume that these individuals (or a subset of them)
had long-term preferences to engage in misconduct, but repeatedly
procrastinated following through-i.e., that their observed appropriate
behavior was due to time-inconsistent honesty. If the policy maker makes
changes that reduce (by a sufficient amount) the immediate costs of
engaging in misconduct (as opposed to, for example, reducing the longterm expected penalties), these individuals will no longer have an incentive
to procrastinate and will follow through with the planned misconduct.
b. Commitment Devices to Assure Misconduct
A sophisticated person will correctly predict that she will be tempted to
procrastinate and will adopt commitment devices to assure her future
misconduct. For example, she may borrow money that she plans to repay
with the proceeds from her misconduct. 4 4 In the previous section, a
person's sophistication led to the adoption of commitment devices to deter

43. If the misconduct produces immediate rewards, then the person's incentive to follow
through as planned will be greater, something that may require policy makers to adopt rules
that increase the immediate costs of misconduct, reduce the immediate rewards, or increase
the incremental loss from misconduct.
44. For example, the loan repayment schedule can be tied to coincide with each period
in which she may be tempted to procrastinate following through with her misconduct.
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misconduct; here however, sophistication increases the amount of actual
misconduct in society.
H. Time-Inconsistent Group Members
The time-inconsistent misconduct model has a number of implications
for misconduct carried out in groups. I will just briefly mention two of
45
them.
1. Planned Defections and Procrastination
A group member who has determined that defecting from a group--e.g.,
whistle-blowing-has positive expected returns will nonetheless repeatedly
procrastinate, as long as the immediate costs of defecting are sufficiently
high. One implication is that the penalties necessary to keep coconspirators
from defecting are lower than those predicted by the standard model. If the
penalty is immediate in nature, it only has to be high enough to make
procrastination worthwhile; the penalty does not need to turn defection into
a negative expected returns proposition.
I argue that hate groups, gangs, cartels, and criminal organizations will
tend to be more cohesive than theory predicts since the penalties to prevent
defections are lower than one would expect. Policy makers who want to
cause group members to defect need to adopt policies that reduce the
immediate costs of defection (e.g., the witness protection plan, anonymous
whistle-blowing, clemency for whistle-blowers); alternatively, policy
makers can increase the immediate rewards from defection by a sufficient
amount (e.g., monetary rewards for whistle-blowing, public praise, and
payment or subsidizing of any legal fees).
More generally, timeinconsistent individuals will remain in groups longer than standard theory
predicts. This has implication not only in cases of misconduct but other
types of group activities.
2. Procrastination and Collective Action
Second, forming groups often requires potential group members to incur
a number of immediate costs-in time, effort, coordination, and other
transaction costs. Therefore, as a general matter, overcoming collectiveaction problems will be more difficult than standard collective-action theory
predicts, since even when a sufficient number of potential group members
are willing to contribute, they may nonetheless procrastinate following
through.
This has implications for the formation of groups of
coconspirators and cartels. A policy maker can exploit time inconsistency
by increasing the immediate costs of collusion. In other words, the

45. I develop these implications in more detail in Manuel A. Utset, Hyperbolic
Discounting, Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, and Collective Action (Apr. 2005) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
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arguments regarding time-inconsistent honesty can be generalized to the
context of group formation.
3. Commitment Devices for Group Members
In the discussion of time-inconsistent honesty, I argued that a
sophisticated time-inconsistent person will adopt commitment devices to
make sure that she does not procrastinate following through with planned
misconduct (i.e., misconduct with positive expected returns). This type of
commitment device is more common than may initially appear. The mafia
and certain gangs use formal initiation rites-e.g., killing someone-and
similar institutional strategies that act as commitment devices. 4 6 These
institutional features of criminal organizations are usually explained as
devices that group members adopt to make sure that other group members
do not defect.
My claim is that a group member may independently value these
institutions as commitment devices to assure that she follows through with
planned misconduct. After all, the "internal" immediate costs of taking a
morally abhorrent action, such as killing someone, may be sufficiently high
to lead her to procrastinate following through; even though by assumption
she believes that committing the crime has positive expected return-i.e., it
is a crime that a time-consistent criminal would carry out at the allotted
time. Coconspirators often need to coordinate the timing of their criminal
acts, making this type of procrastination an obstacle to coordination.
Additionally, a group member with long-term preferences not to defect,
may nonetheless engage in time-inconsistent defection-for example, when
she is offered a sufficiently large immediate reward, such as a reduction of
the maximum penalty for a crime she has committed.
IV. TIME-INCONSISTENT MISCONDUCT AND LAWYERS

Models of lawyer misconduct that adopt the standard time-inconsistency
assumption will fail to capture the type of misconduct predicted by the
time-inconsistent misconduct model. This part will focus on two general
conclusions that follow from applying the time-inconsistent misconduct
model to lawyer misconduct. First, a time-inconsistent lawyer with a longterm preference to avoid engaging in any opportunistic behavior-because
acting opportunistically has negative expected returns-may nonetheless
engage in repeated nibbling opportunism. Thus, the time-inconsistent
misconduct model predicts that lawyers will take more opportunistic,
illegal, or otherwise improper actions than predicted by the standard model.
Moreover, the nibbling opportunism argument can be extended to provide
an alternative explanation of the moral disintegration of lawyers.
46. Having group members engage in murder is a particularly powerful commitment
device, since there is no statute of limitations on prosecuting murder. I thank my colleague
Daniel Medwed for this point.
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Second, a lawyer with a long-term preference to take a required action at
the appropriate time may nonetheless repeatedly procrastinate following
through.
The immediate costs of taking a required action-e.g.,
confrontation costs or mere effort--can lead a corporate lawyer to
procrastinate acquiring information when she has been put on notice of
potential problems, monitoring and confronting managers, disclosing
problems to the board of directors or regulators, withdrawing
representation, and retracting opinions and previous advice.
A. Nibbling Opportunism and Lawyer Misconduct
Lawyers owe a duty of loyalty to their clients. Like other fiduciaries,
however, a lawyer may face repeated opportunities to engage in self-dealing
transactions.
Lawyers have the ability to engage in this type of
opportunistic behavior because contracts between lawyers and their clients
are highly incomplete, particularly in ongoing relationships, such as those
47
involving corporate counsel.
1. Nibbling Opportunism
Assume that a lawyer makes a long-term decision to abstain from taking
a prohibited action in all future periods because she has concluded that
taking that action has negative expected returns. Given the no new
information assumption, a time-consistent lawyer will never take the
prohibited action. However, a time-inconsistent lawyer will take the
prohibited action in each period in which the incremental gain of an
opportunistic nibble exceeds the incremental loss. A lawyer may engage in
repeated nibbling opportunism of this sort, even though it leads her (as well
as her clients and society) to incur large aggregate welfare losses.
A lawyer is more likely to engage in nibbling opportunism in contexts in
which she has the ability to engage in incremental misconduct over
relatively long periods of time; these include embezzling funds, overbilling
clients, lying in court proceedings or during negotiations, helping managers
put together highly questionable or fraudulent transactions, and drafting
misleading disclosure documents. Of course, lawyers will often engage in
this type of misconduct because they have determined that it has positive
expected returns. However, a subset of the observed misconduct of lawyers
can be explained in a more intuitive fashion, I believe, by resorting to the
nibbling opportunism argument; this is particularly true in contexts where
the aggregate costs of a lawyer's repeated misconduct over time greatly
exceed the aggregate benefits. A time-consistent explanation would require
47. No contract of any length or complexity is ever complete: The transaction costs of
identifying all possible contingencies, bargaining over the obligations of parties to account
for those contingencies, and writing contracts that correctly specify the parties'
understanding will in most cases exceed the benefits. For a review of the law-andeconomics literature on contract incompleteness, see Alan Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts,
in 2 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics & the Law, supra note 33, at 277.
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that one assume that either the lawyer discounted the risks of getting caught
by a very significant amount or had a very high level of long-term
impatience.
2. A Numerical Example
Suppose that a lawyer has the opportunity to embezzle money from her
client over twenty periods. The lawyer can embezzle $1000 in each period;
however, each time in which the lawyer does so, she triggers a $1150
penalty-this penalty will be imposed with one hundred percent probability
one period immediately after each act of embezzlement; the lawyer is aware
of all these facts. 48 Therefore, embezzling funds always produces a net loss
to the lawyer of $150. In period zero, both a time-consistent and timeinconsistent lawyer reach the same conclusion-to abstain from embezzling
funds in all twenty periods, since each act of embezzlement has negative
expected returns. The time-consistent lawyer will always keep to her longterm preference and never embezzle funds.
a. The Incentive to Nibble
From a long-term perspective, the lawyer's preference for immediate
gratification is not a factor; thus she values the $1000 reward at its true face
value. However, from a short-term perspective-i.e., when she is deciding
whether or not to take an opportunistic nibble-the time-inconsistent
lawyer gets additional utility from her ability to grab the $1000
immediately.
Assume that the time-inconsistent lawyer has a preference for immediate
gratification that leads her to give an added weight of twenty percent to
immediate rewards. This means, in effect, that the lawyer values the
additional utility due to the immediacy of the reward at $200. Each period,
the time-inconsistent lawyer compares this $200 incremental gain from
taking an opportunistic nibble, with the $150 incremental loss (i.e., the
guaranteed net penalty from embezzlement).
Given that the incremental gain from embezzlement always exceeds the
incremental loss by $50, the time-inconsistent lawyer will have a short-term
How many
preference to embezzle funds in all twenty periods.
opportunistic nibbles a lawyer actually takes will depend on how well she
anticipates her future temptation to embezzle funds.
b. Awareness, Commitment, and Welfare Losses
A naive lawyer will embezzle $1000 in all twenty periods. Since
embezzling funds has negative expected returns, starting in period zero and
48. As before, I assume that the long-term impatience captured by exponential
discounting is not a factor-i.e., the exponential discount factor 3 = 1. See supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
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each period thereafter, the naive lawyer will make a long-term decision to
abstain from embezzling funds in the following period. However beginning
in period one and each period thereafter, the naive lawyer will grab the
immediate $1000 rewards, believing incorrectly each time that it will be her
last opportunistic nibble.
As a result, the naive lawyer will receive an aggregate gross reward of
$20,000 over the twenty periods, but incurs a guaranteed aggregate penalty
of $23,000. The naive lawyer's failure to adhere to her long-term
preferences yields her an aggregate welfare loss of $3000. A sophisticated
lawyer, on the other hand, will correctly predict that she will want to
embezzle funds in all twenty periods. In order to prevent herself from
doing so, she will adopt a commitment device that reduces the incremental
gain (or increases the incremental loss) of each opportunistic nibble by at
least $51.
A "partially naive" lawyer underappreciates her future
temptation to embezzle funds and will adopt commitment devices to
prevent only those opportunistic nibbles that she believes that she will
actually take. Therefore, the partially naive lawyer will take more
opportunistic nibbles than a sophisticated lawyer, but fewer than a naive
one.
c. Uncertainty
In real-world contexts, the penalties for misconduct are not guaranteed,
since there is always some probability that the lawyer's misconduct will not
be discovered and prosecuted. Suppose once again that a lawyer has the
opportunity to embezzle $1000, but that now she will be able to do so in an
unbounded number of periods. Each time that the lawyer engages in
misconduct it triggers an $11,500 penalty. Unlike before, the penalty is no
longer guaranteed; assume also that the lawyer believes that there is a ten
percent chance that she will be caught and prosecuted for any one act of
embezzlement. This means that in effect, the lawyer believes that the
expected penalty is $1150 (the same as before). 4 9 Finally, the timeinconsistent lawyer has the same preference for immediate gratification as
before.
The time-consistent and time-inconsistent lawyers again make long-term
decisions to abstain from embezzling funds in all future periods, since
embezzlement in any period still has negative expected returns. As before,
the naive lawyer will embezzle funds in all periods. Suppose that after
embezzling for twenty periods the naive lawyer is one of the unlucky ten
percent that gets caught. The lawyer receives the same gross reward as
before-$20,000-but now incurs a penalty of $230,000, for an aggregate
welfare loss of $210,000. Suppose instead that the lawyer embezzles funds
for 100 periods and then gets caught. This lawyer embezzled $100,000, but
incurs a penalty of $1.15 million, for an aggregate welfare loss of $1.05
49. 1 will assume that the lawyer is risk neutral.
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million. Again, this is a lawyer who had a long-term preference not to
embezzle any funds. Therefore, her aggregate welfare losses are a social
loss, and one that could have been avoided through the use of commitment
devices. A sophisticated lawyer would adopt her own devices, but a naive
or sufficiently partially naive lawyer would require external devices.
B. Procrastinationby CorporateLawyers
The recent corporate scandals such as Enron and WorldCom identified
various types of highly questionable behavior by corporate lawyers,
including the failure of corporate counsel to (1) challenge questionable
transactions; (2) acquire additional information once on notice of potential
misconduct by managers, board members, or auditors; and (3) disclose the
observed misconduct of managers and auditors to the board of directors or
other appropriate parties. These three types of misconduct involved
required actions that lawyers either failed to take or repeatedly delayed
taking. The time-inconsistent misconduct model predicts that lawyers with
a long-term preference to act at the appropriate time will procrastinate
following through whenever the incremental gain from procrastination (in
the form of avoiding the immediate costs of acting) exceeds the incremental
loss. 50 The immediate costs that can lead a lawyer to procrastinate taking
these actions include: time and effort, confrontation costs, ostracism by
others in the group, and loss of salary.
These are the same costs that commentators have used to explain why
lawyers in the recent scandals engaged in misconduct. However, it is
important to note the difference. I agree that a lawyer will engage in timeconsistent misconduct whenever misconduct has positive expected returns.
My claim, however, is that these immediate costs can lead a lawyer to
repeatedly procrastinate taking these actions notwithstanding a long-term
preference to abstain from misconduct. One important implication is that a
manager can take advantage of a lawyer's time inconsistency. A manager
who wants to prevent a time-inconsistent lawyer from taking an action that
would hurt the manager can increase the lawyer's immediate costs of acting
by a sufficient amount to cause the lawyer to repeatedly procrastinate; even
relatively small, but immediate penalties such as group pressure may have
such an effect.

50. The general problem of lawyer procrastination is something that is acknowledged in
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Model Rule 1.3 requires that "[a] lawyer shall act
with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." Model Rules of Prof'l
Conduct R. 1.3 (2003). Additionally, comment three to that rule states, "Perhaps no
professional shortcoming is more widely resented than procrastination." Id. R. 1.3 cmt. 3.
The comment goes on to say that procrastination can have real material effects on the
client's interest-for example, "as when a lawyer overlooks a statute of limitations" or more
intangible effects such as causing the client anxiety and "undermin[ing] confidence in the
lawyer's trustworthiness." Id.
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C. Policy Implications: DeterringTime-Inconsistent Lawyers
In order to effectively deter time-inconsistent misconduct by lawyers, a
policy maker will have to change the short-term preferences for immediate
gratification that motivate the misconduct.
1. Deterring Nibbling Opportunism
A policy maker who wants to deter a lawyer from engaging in nibbling
opportunism can use two general strategies. First, she can reduce the
immediate rewards from each opportunistic nibble. For example, the law
can make it more difficult for lawyers to have direct access to client's funds
in the way that banks, casinos, and brokerage houses do for all of their
employees (except for a well-specified and monitored group of employees
charged with handling cash and other fungible consideration).
Second, the policy maker can increase the incremental loss to the lawyer
from each nibble. Adopting a requirement to memorialize and keep careful
records, providing clear justification for decisions in contexts that are prone
to misconduct can help; this is because trying to justify improper actions
will make the incremental loss of misconduct more salient.
More generally, rules that directly target reducing the immediate reward
of misconduct should be more effective in deterring nibbling opportunism
than those that increase the expected costs of misconduct; the latter, by
definition, are delayed until the misconduct has been discovered and the
lawyer punished. A rule that requires a lawyer to post a bond to cover any
losses from client accounts will be more effective than a rule that reduces
the net expected returns by an equivalent amount, but which involves
greater ex post policing, prosecutions, and penalties. Posting a bond makes
the incremental losses from misconduct more salient.
2. Deterring Procrastination by Lawyers
In order to deter lawyers from repeatedly procrastinating taking required
actions a policy maker can adopt rules that reduce the immediate costs of
acting. For example, section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act imposes new
disclosure requirements on corporate lawyers. A lawyer is now required to
"report evidence of a material violation of securities law or breach of
fiduciary duty" to the chief legal counsel or chief executive officer, and if
those officers fail to remedy the problem the lawyer has to take that
5
information "up the ladder" to the audit committee and board of directors. '
Section 307 in effect helps reduce the immediate costs to lawyers of (1)
confronting managers who are acting illegally, and (2) withdrawing their
representation of a corporate client. It also increases costs to lawyers who
procrastinate taking information "up the ladder" or following through once

51. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
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they become aware that their original disclosure did not lead to the required
change in corporate policy.
3. Time-Inconsistent Honesty and Lawyer Regulation
Suppose that a lawyer determines that a certain type of misconduct has
positive expected returns and thus makes a long-term decision to engage in
misconduct. However, if the misconduct requires that the lawyer incur an
immediate cost, the lawyer will procrastinate following through with the
planned misconduct in each period in which those costs are sufficiently
high. 52 For example, the planned misconduct may involve an elaborate
fraud that requires significant investments in time and effort up front, and
will yield rewards in later periods, or requires the formation of a group of
perpetrators and the need to incur costs to screen potential group members
and coordinate actions.
Policy makers can take advantage of time-inconsistent honesty to deter
lawyer misconduct by adopting rules that have the express purpose of
increasing the immediate costs of engaging in misconduct. One such
approach is to adopt gatekeeper schemes in which gatekeepers not only
engage in their usual gatekeeping activities, but police each other. For
example, the much criticized section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act adopts
this type of cross-monitoring procedure, requiring that managers make
representations regarding the company's internal control procedures and
then requiring auditors "to attest to, and report on, the assessment made by
the management. ' 53 This, in turn, leads accounting firms to hire lawyers to
help prepare these attestations. It may well be that critics are correct that
section 404 imposes potentially high compliance costs; however, the rule
also increases the immediate costs to managers and auditors of engaging in
certain types of misconduct, and, thus, may help foster time-inconsistent
honesty (although not necessarily in the most efficient manner).
D. Time-InconsistentMisconduct: An Alternative Explanation to Moral
Disintegration
Questions of integrity arise when a person has a set of principles that she
wants to adhere to and she faces one or more decisions in which those
principles are challenged by outside pressures; this in turns requires that the
person chooses to either adhere to her principles or yield. A person of
integrity is one who after some amount of reflection and deliberation does
not yield (or does not easily yield) to these outside pressures. Of course a
person's principles change over time due to a variety of factors and

52. If the lawyers' planned misconduct provides them with an immediate reward-e.g.,
embezzling money from a client's escrow account-then the time-inconsistent lawyer will
follow through with the planned misconduct.
53. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404(b), 15 U.S.C. § 7262(b).
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influences. 54 Integrity arguments must therefore draw some distinction
between legitimate changes in principles and illegitimate ones that
undermine a person's integrity.
1. A Moral Integrity Contract
The time-inconsistent misconduct model offers an alternative explanation
for why lawyers may repeatedly override their personal moral principles in
a manner that would lead them down a path of moral disintegration.
Assume that a lawyer has identified a well-defined context and set of
contingencies within that context which will require her to make a series of
binary-yes-no--decisions regarding a series of actions. Additionally she
has also identified a set of moral rules that map one-to-one to each decision
and provide her with the "moral answer" applicable to each action: either
yes (take the action) or no (abstain). In other words, assume a world in
which a lawyer has written a complete "moral integrity contract" to govern
her future selves regarding a series of actions, where for each action there is
an unambiguous moral rule that applies.
Suppose that there is no external enforcement mechanism for the
contract, but the lawyer has concluded that the costs of breaching her
integrity contract always exceed the benefits and has made a long-term
decision to never breach the contract. Moreover, in reaching this decision,
the lawyer took into account every possible future context in which she will
have the opportunity to breach the contract and grab an immediate reward.
A naive lawyer, however, will breach this contract in each period in which
that immediate reward is sufficiently high compared to the incremental loss
from breaching the contract "just that one time." A sophisticated lawyer
will anticipate her future temptation to engage in these unethical nibbles
and adopt commitment devices-e.g., contracts with third parties who
would penalize her each time that she breaches her integrity contract. Most
lawyers, of course, will be partially naive, having some awareness of their
future temptation to take unethical nibbles, but being overoptimistic about
their ability not to yield to temptation.
While this is a highly stylized set of facts, I believe that it captures an
important source of the moral disintegration of lawyers: their preference
for immediate gratification and a failure to fully appreciate the need to
adopt commitment devices. This is not only true of the individual lawyer,
but also of the bar.

54. For a discussion of some of the problems that arise due to conflicting second-order
preferences and the lack of internal coherence, see Harry G. Frankfurt, Identification and
Wholeheartedness, in The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays 159,
164-67 (1988) (distinguishing between (1) conflicts between first-order desires that actually
motivate actions and second-order preferences that a person wants to guide their first-order
desires and (2) ambivalence over these second-order preferences-i.e., not embracing any
one of them wholeheartedly).
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2. Does Moral Disintegration Require Moral Condemnation?
Given the possibility of time-inconsistent misconduct one may want to
question whether moral disintegration is something that necessarily calls for
moral condemnation. A lawyer with time-inconsistent preferences can have
a strongly held second-order preference to always act in accordance with
her personal moral principles and still quite comfortably and without
necessarily thinking any less of herself, routinely give in to the pull of
immediate gratification and override those principles. If a person tells us
that she has a long-term preference to abstain from eating chocolate cake
for well-founded health reasons and is observed eating chocolate cake each
day, can one conclude that she does not have a preference to stop eating
55
cake? Not without further evidence.
Yielding to chocolate cake can be due to habit or advertising that has
made cake something that she needs to have; but a much simpler
explanation, and more intuitive, I believe, is that we are used to yielding to
the pull of immediate gratification in almost all areas of our lives.57There is
no shame to it. 56 (In fact it appears to be hard wired in our brains. )
CONCLUSION

In this Article I argued that lawyers, like other people, can engage in
repeated misconduct even though they have a long-term preference to
abstain from misconduct. A lawyer will have an incentive to engage in
nibbling opportunism when the immediate rewards are sufficiently high.
This can lead a lawyer to engage in more misconduct than predicted by
standard models. Additionally, lawyers may repeatedly procrastinate taking
required actions because of a preference to avoid the immediate costs of
taking those actions. Policy makers, I argue, need to take into account
time-inconsistent misconduct, not only because this sort of misconduct can
impose large welfare losses on clients and lawyers, but because it requires
different policy solutions.
The
time-inconsistent
misconduct
arguments
may
appear
counterintuitive. Why would a person willingly engage in misconduct and

55. See Amartya Sen, Choice, Orderings and Morality, in Amartya Sen, Choice,
Welfare and Measurement 74, 80-81 (1982).

56. British philosopher J.L. Austin wrote as follows:
I am very partial to ice cream, and a bombe is served divided into segments
corresponding one to one with the persons at High Table: I am tempted to help
myself to two segments and do so, thus succumbing to temptation and even
conceivably (but why necessarily?) going against my principles. But do I lose
control of myself? Do I raven, do I snatch the morsels from the dish and wolf
them down, impervious to the consternation of my colleagues? Not a bit of it. We
often succumb to temptation with calm and even with finesse.
J.L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, in J.L. Austin, Philosophical Papers 175, 198 n.1 (3d ed.
1979).
57. See Jonathan Cohen et. al., Separate Neural Systems Value Immediate and Delayed
Monetary Rewards, Science, Oct. 15, 2004, at 306.
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incur a penalty that she knows exceeds the actual rewards? Why would she
not know that the added short-term utility motivating her is transient and
intangible? The answer is simple. Individuals make these same types of
determinations when they choose to overconsume in other areas of their
lives. There is no reason to believe that when people are faced with
penalties and rewards in legal contexts that they are not equally moved by
the pull of immediate gratification.

